A principal-agent relationship exists between hotel owners and the management companies which often operate their hotels. In addition, they both act as principals to a mutual agent, the hotel's General Manager, who is tasked with trying to achieve each parties' objectives. Extensive research on hotel management agreements which govern the owner-operator relationship has demonstrated that these objectives are often incongruent. However, the property-level managerial and performance implications of their goal incongruence has not been empirically examined. This study analyzes these issues using a matched sample of surveys from both owners and operators across 64 hotels operated under hotel management agreements. Using structural equations modeling, we demonstrate that owner-operator goal congruence positively impacts hotel performance and that this relationship is both mediated and moderated by the hotel General Manager's autonomy. A principal-agent relationship exists between hotel owners and the management companies 3 which often operate their hotels. In addition, they both act as principals to a mutual agent, the 4 hotel's General Manager, who is tasked with trying to achieve each parties' objectives. Extensive 5 research on hotel management agreements which govern the owner-operator relationship has 6 demonstrated that these objectives are often incongruent. However, the property-level 7 managerial and performance implications of their goal incongruence has not been empirically 8 examined. This study analyzes these issues using a matched sample of surveys from both owners 9 and operators across 64 hotels operated under hotel management agreements. Using structural
The traditional scenario whereby a hotel owner engages a GM results in a single 110 principal-agent situation (Panvisavas and Taylor, 2008 ). An HMA, however, implies multiple 111 principals and agents since not only do owners and operators both act as principals to a single 112 agent (the GM), but because the operator is also the owner's agent (Dev et al., 2010) . Although 113 the GM is usually an employee of the management company, given the position's responsibilities 114 and the HMA reporting structure, they are typically responsible to both the owner and operator.
115
As a result, the GM is effectively the primary agent acting on behalf of both principals (Hodari 116 and Sturman, 2014). HMAs therefore create a myriad of opportunities and incentives for 117 multiple agents to shirk on their efforts; they require extensive and expensive monitoring by 118 principals and are, unsurprisingly, considered to be the most problematic of all operating 119 concepts in the hospitality industry (Schlup, 2004) . estate value even though asset value appreciation is of paramount importance to owners (Dev et underlying investment. There is also a potential 'horizon problem' (Turner and Guilding, 2013) 133 because operators tend to emphasize customer relationships and long-term success of their 134 business while owners are more likely to have a short-term focus that emphasizes payback and 135 return.
136
Implications of the divergent interests of owners and operators, and the challenges arising These studies have found that the two parties' conflicting objectives often create challenges for 152 the management company to implement operational and strategic decisions. These challenges are 153 often due to increased owner influence (see Beals and Denton, 2005; Eyster, 1997 which can reduce operator incentive fees (Schlup, 2004) . This has led operators to complain that 157 if their management fee is contingent upon performance then, "shouldn't they be given the right 158 to manage the hotel free from the owner?" (Goddard & Standish-Wilkinson, 2002 , p. 8).
159
As the nexus between owner and operator, GMs are highly subject to the challenges 160 which arise from their split (Guilding, 2006) . Low goal congruence should have a particularly 161 strong impact on GMs as they act as agents to both owner and operator. This is because goal 162 incongruence between multiple principals often creates conflicting mandates for agents (Buckley 163 and Chapman, 1997) who thus face "wrenching choices among the legitimate interests of 164 multiple principals" (Shapiro, 2005 ; p. 279).
165
Greater goal alignment between principals, meanwhile, suggests that agents will be less 166 conflicted about what to do, and thus be more effective. One reason for this is that aligned 167 principals are more likely to send one clear management message to their mutual agent, thereby 168 reducing the conflict which normally arises when one receives incompatible job demands from 169 multiple superiors (Kahn et al., 1964) . Similarly, their agent is more likely to receive a more 170 cohesive and explicit set of tasks and directives, thereby reducing ambiguity concerning his/her 171 role (Rizzo et al., 1970) . This is important since alliances and outsourcing can increase a 172 hospitality manager's level of both ambiguity and conflict , both of which 173 have been repeatedly found to decrease managerial performance (see Tubre and Collins, 2000) .
174
Thus, greater goal congruence should mean that their mutual agent is less divided about which 175 principal to serve since his/her actions are more likely to simultaneously align with each of the 176 principals' goals.
Increased goal congruence between hotel owners and operators should therefore result in 178 a more consistent, cohesive and effective set of decisions with regard to the hotel's management.
179
Given this, and the importance of GMs to hotel success, we hypothesize that: 
201
Greater monitoring also erodes the agent's autonomy to make important decisions 202 without control, approval and/or interference from higher hierarchical levels (Brock, 2003; 203 Ouakouk et al., 2014). This is important because the discretion that autonomy provides managers Given the overall importance of goal congruence for hotel performance, although we 211 expect that owner-operator congruence will be associated with greater GM autonomy, we do not 212 expect GM autonomy to fully capture the effect of such congruence. While goal congruence 213 should be positively related to hotel performance through its influence on GM autonomy, goal 214 congruence should also affect hotel performance through other means. As such, we predict:
215
H4. The effect of owner-operator Goal Congruence on Hotel Performance will be 216 partially, but not fully, mediated by GM Autonomy.
217
In fact, given the importance of goal congruence for the successful performance of a 218 hotel, we expect that the positive effects of this congruence will be greater than just its direct and 219 mediated effects. We expect that goal congruence will be more effective when the GM 220 simultaneously has the autonomy to act. That is, the potential value from the goal congruence 221 can be better unleashed when the GM has the ability to act on those goals and achieve the desired 
242
We asked respondents to answer the questionnaire designated for them (with GMs 
251
In order to assess potential concerns associated with nonresponse bias, we compared the 252 respondents with matched data with those with unmatched data. We found that hotel that our relatively small matched sample is representative of our total sample.
256
We also found that (p < 0.05) matched hotels were larger (358 rooms) than those that did not 257 match (194 rooms) and that owners of unmatched hotels reported higher performance than those 258 of matched hotels (p < 0.05). Given this difference, we sought to determine if this could limit the 259 generalizability of our results. It is possible that our tests for the relationship between congruence 260 and performance may have been based more heavily on underperforming hotels; however,
261
further examination of the performance measure suggests that this is not a substantive concern.
262
The final sample still had a wide range of performance levels (from 1.44 to 5.81). Additionally, used (where 6 indicated higher priority).
279
The overall measure of Congruence was computed as the Euclidian distance between 280 each of the individual priority questions. However, to rescale the measure so that higher values 281 indicate greater congruence, we subtracted the sum from the maximum possible (i.e., (6-1) 2 ) 282 value so that:
Congruence measures for each individual functional area were similarly computed, but 285 using only the subset of items related to the specific function. These too were reverse-scored so and Meckling, 1976).
511
Our findings may be explained by the notion that when multiple principals seek to control 512 or influence their mutual agent, they provide conflicting "mandates" which prevent the agent 513 from pursuing a coherent and/or cohesive set of operational and strategic choices, which in turn 514 negatively impacts performance. Instead, we suggest that multiple principals who are themselves 515 aligned with regard to firm objectives, may not only be less concerned with controlling their 516 mutual agent's decisions, but also more likely to help provide a context within which managerial 517 decisions can help the firm achieve internal alignment. This, in turn, not only influences the 518 firm's performance, but also both principals' economic returns. 
532
Our study has also contributed to the agency theory literature by demonstrating that in a 533 multiple agency scenario it is important for principals to have congruent objectives. Agency
534
theory research has long demonstrated that agents may diverge from principals' goals, and that 535 the latter must control this. Our study has, however, also demonstrated that in multiple agency 536 situations the principals must also ensure that their own goals are congruent as this results in 537 greater performance, especially because of the effect this has on the principals' mutual agent.
538
Thus while the link between principals and agents' objectives was already firmly established, congruence can impact hotel performance, the latter being particularly important given the 551 important role HMAs play in the modern hotel industry structure.
552
In terms of our sample and methodology, it is the first study that has been able to gather and GMs achieve such congruence and performance. 
